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Abstract. Schools with the highest average student performance
are often the smallest schools; localities with the highest rates of
some cancers are frequently small; and the effects observed in clin-
ical trials are likely to be largest for the smallest numbers of sub-
jects. Informal explanations of this “small-schools phenomenon”
point to the fact that the sample means of smaller samples have
higher variances. But this cannot be a complete explanation: If
we draw two samples from a diffuse distribution that is symmetric
about some point, then the chance that the smaller sample has
larger mean is 50%. A particular consequence of results proved
below is that if one draws three or more samples of different sizes
from the same normal distribution, then the sample mean of the
smallest sample is most likely to be highest, the sample mean of the
second smallest sample is second most likely to be highest, and so
on; this is true even though for any pair of samples, each one of the
pair is equally likely to have the larger sample mean. The same
effect explains why heteroscedasticity can result in misleadingly
small nominal p-values in nonparametric tests of association.
Our conclusions are relevant to certain stochastic choice models,
including the following generalization of Thurstone’s Law of Com-
parative Judgment. There are n items. Item i is preferred to item
j if Zi < Zj , where Z is a random n-vector of preference scores.
Suppose P{Zi = Zj} = 0 for i 6= j, so there are no ties. Item k is
the favorite if Zk < mini6=k Zi. Let pi denote the chance that item
i is the favorite. We characterize a large class of distributions for
Z for which p1 > p2 > · · · > pn. Our results are most surprising
when P{Zi < Zj} = P{Zi > Zj} =
1
2
for i 6= j, so neither of any
two items is likely to be preferred over the other in a pairwise com-
parison. Then, under suitable assumptions, p1 > p2 > · · · > pn
when the variability of Zi decreases with i in an appropriate sense.
Our conclusions echo the proverb “Fortune favors the bold.”
1. Introduction
When an achievement test is administered to all students of a par-
ticular age in a U.S. state, it is typically observed that there is a dis-
proportionate number of small schools among those with the highest
average scores [Wai07]. This “small-schools phenomenon” is to be ex-
pected even if the scores of individual students at small schools come
from the same population as those at other schools: the standard de-
viation of the average score at a school with n students is proportional
to 1√
n
; averages at small schools will thus be more variable than those
at larger schools; and hence small schools are likely to be dispropor-
tionately represented among the highest performing (and lowest per-
forming) schools. [Wai07] lists several more examples of this effect such
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as small communities having what seem to be unusually high rates of
kidney cancer and small cities appearing to be safer than larger ones.
The results we establish here bear on how the probability that a
school has the highest average depends on its size under the assump-
tion that student performances are drawn from a common population.
Suppose that the n ≥ 3 schools are listed in order of increasing size
and Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn are the average test scores. Assume that the Zk are
independent and symmetrically distributed around a common mean µ
and that |Zi − µ| stochastically dominates |Zj − µ| when i < j (for
example, this will hold approximately when each Zk is approximately
Gaussian because then Zk is approximately of the form
σ√
Nk
Yk, where
σ is the standard deviation for an individual student’s score, Nk is the
number of students at the kth school, and Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn are independent
standard normal random variables). It follows from the results we es-
tablish that P{Zk is the largest of Z1, . . . , Zn} is decreasing in k—the
smaller a school is the more likely it is to have the highest average test
score—even though no school has an advantage over any other in a
“head-to-head” competition (P{Zi > Zj} = P{Zj > Zi} for any pair
i 6= j).
We can describe this conclusion a little more picturesquely. Consider
a group of n ≥ 3 independent individuals with equal skill, in the sense
that each individual’s performance is symmetrically distributed about
some common mean, so that in a head-to-head contest between any two
there is an equal chance that either will win. For each individual k, let
Prk(x) be the chance that the absolute value of the difference between
his or her performance and the shared expected performance exceeds x.
Suppose the individuals are well ordered by these probabilities: for all
x > 0, Pr1(x) > Pr2(x) > · · · > Prn(x). Under these assumptions, in-
dividual 1 has the highest probability of having the best performance,
individual 2 has the second-highest, and so on. If a greater chance
of extreme performance results from deliberate risk-taking, then in-
dividual 1 is the “boldest” and the most likely to perform best. In
this sense, fortune favors the bold. (Of course, symmetry dictates that
individual 1 is also most likely to perform worst!)
To make our results mathematically precise and to connect them
to the literature on stochastic models for ranking and ordering, we
require the following notation and terminology. Label the n items with
the set of integers [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. An individual’s preferences
can be represented in two related ways: either we report the order
vector (w(1), w(2), . . . , w(n)), where w(1) ∈ [n] is the label of the most
favored item, w(2) is the label of the second-most favored item, etc., or
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we report the corresponding rank vector (y(1), y(2), . . . , y(n)), where
w(y(i)) = i for i ∈ [n].
The order vector and rank vector are permutations of the set [n].
There is a huge literature on models of random permutations, much of
which attempts to capture features of how individuals actually go about
assigning orders or rankings using whatever information they have at
their disposal. The standard reference is [Mar95], with [Dia88, FV93]
as useful adjuncts.
The earliest model for assigning orders is due to [Thu27, Thu31]. In
Thurstone’s model, the item labeled i is associated with a (real-valued)
random variable Zi, where the random vector Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) is such
that P{Zi = Zj} = 0 for i 6= j, and the resulting order vector is
(i1, i2, . . . , in) if Zi1 < Zi2 < . . . < Zin. One may interpret −Zi as
the desirability of item i measured on a one-dimensional scale, so that
items are ordered in decreasing order of their desirability.
In many applications, it is more natural to consider Zi rather
than −Zi to be the desirability. For example, one might model an elec-
tion by letting Zi be the number of voters who will vote for candidate i
(see, for example, [Las06]). The candidate who garners the most votes
wins the election. As another example, consider Thompson Sampling
for the multi-armed bandit problem in machine learning. The random
variable Zi models the benefit resulting from pulling arm i. The Zi
are sampled and the arm with maximum Zi is pulled [Tho33, AG11].
Nonetheless, we shall continue here to follow the tradition of Thurstone,
and let −Zi model the desirability of item i.
Let Z∗ denote min{Zi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, the smallest Zi value, and let
I∗ denote argmin{Zi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, the index of the minimum Zi value.
Let pi denote the probability that the rank of item i is 1 (i.e., that
i = I∗).
Given a specification of Z, there are three closely-related problems
to consider:
(1) Finding the distribution of Z∗. See [Gum04, KN00, dHF06,
Res08] for a sample of the extensive body of work in this area.
(2) Determining which i is most likely to be I∗.
(3) Given i, deriving an expression for pi.
We do not consider problem 1 here; our focus is on problem 2, par-
ticularly when, as is usually the case, solving 2 by solving 3 seems
intractable. Most generally, we are concerned with finding conditions
that imply that p1 > p2 > · · · > pn.
We briefly survey various distributional assumptions on Z =
(Z1, . . . , Zn) that have been considered in this context.
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Thurstone proposed taking Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) to have a non-
degenerate Gaussian distribution. Despite its conceptual simplicity,
this model is rather daunting computationally. Here pi is the proba-
bility that Z falls in the region R := {z ∈ Rn : zi < zj , j 6= i}, an
intersection of half-spaces
⋂
j 6=i{z ∈ R
n : zi − zj < 0}. We can write
Z = µ + XΣ
1
2 , where µ is the mean vector of Z, Σ is the variance-
covariance matrix of Z, Σ
1
2 is the positive definite symmetric square
root of Σ, and X is a vector with independent standard normal en-
tries. We are therefore interested in the probability that X falls in
the polyhedral region (R−µ)Σ−
1
2 . It is usually not possible to express
such probabilities in a simple closed form, but there is a large literature
on approximating them numerically using various ingenious recursive
schemes—see, for example, [GDS02, MHK03, Cra08].
Appendix A shows that when {Zi}
n
i=1 are independent Gaussian ran-
dom variables, computing the probabilities {pi}
n
i=1 explicitly is some-
what complex even when n = 3. Appendix B shows that this is also
true when {Zi}
n
i=1 is a vector of independent random variables with
bilateral exponential distributions. However, if all one cares about is
the the ordering of the pi’s, then the results of the present paper may
apply to cases where explicitly computing {pi} is intractable.
[Dan50] suggested taking the random vector Z in Thurstone’s general
model to be of the form (θ1 + X1, . . . , θn + Xn), where θ1, . . . , θn are
real-valued parameters and X1, . . . , Xn are independent and identically
distributed (IID) random variables. Equivalently (by exponentiating),
one can take Z to be of the form (γ1Y1, . . . , γnYn), where γ1, . . . , γn are
positive parameters and Y1, . . . , Yn are IID positive random variables.
It is a consequence of our results here that if θi < θj (or γi < γj),
then i is at least as likely as j to have rank 1, and this inequality is
strict under mild conditions. [Sav57] provides a number of other results
about the dependence on the parameters of various other probabilities
related to the order and rank vectors.
A particularly tractable example of the multiplicative version
of Daniels’ type of Thurstonian model is when (Z1, . . . , Zn) =
(γ1Y1, . . . , γnYn) with Y1, . . . , Yn IID exponential random variables. In
this case the probability of a given order vector (i1, . . . , in) can be com-
puted explicitly: it is
λi1∑
j λj
λi2∑
j 6=i1 λj
λi3∑
j 6=i1,i2 λj
· · · ,
where λi := γ
−1
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This model is due to [Pla75] and
[Luc59], and was studied in [Sil80, Sil84] as the vase model: if we
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imagine a vase containing n types of balls with balls of type i being
in proportion λi/(
∑
j λj) and we remove balls one-by-one uniformly
without replacement, then the order in which the n types first ap-
pear is given by this model. The Plackett and Luce model is the only
Thurstonian model of the Daniels type that satisfies the axioms laid out
in [Luc59] for a rational choice procedure—see [Yel77] for a discussion.
The Plackett and Luce model is also the stationary distribution of a
discrete-time Markov chain that is sometimes called the Tsetlin library
process or the move-to-the-front self-organizing list. Here the items
are pictured as books and an order vector (i1, . . . , in) corresponds to
a stack with the book labeled in on the bottom and the book labeled
i1 on top. In each step of the chain, book i is chosen with probability
proportional to λi, removed from its current position in the stack, and
placed on top of the stack. See, e.g., [Riv76] for early work on this
process, and [Fil96] for a detailed analysis of this Markov chain and an
extensive review of the related literature.
Thurstonian models based on random vectors with much more com-
plex structure are discussed in [Bo¨c93, Bo¨c06].
Subsection 5.1 presents a third, more involved, example that illus-
trates a model of a more complex type that is not built from IID random
variables, but where the assumptions of our main result, Theorem 3.1,
giving the ordering of {pi}, still applies. This example is cast in terms
of the times taken by three workers to complete three randomly as-
signed tasks. The expected time for a worker to complete a task is
the same for every (worker, task) pair, but the performance of the
first worker is more variable than that of the second, which is in turn
more variable than that of the third. Again, computing {pi} is tedious
and complex, but Theorem 3.1 easily allows one to find their ordering
without explicit computation and to conclude that the first worker has
the highest probability of finishing first and the second worker has the
second highest probability of finishing first.
This paper investigates how to determine, in Thurstonian models,
the ordering of the probabilities that each of the given items will be the
most preferred, without having to explicitly compute these probabilities.
In other words, we study the distribution of the first entry in the or-
der vector or, equivalently, the distribution of the label of the item with
rank one, and we seek conditions on the distribution of the random vec-
tor (Z1, . . . , Zn) such that if pi is the probability that the item labeled
i has rank one, then p1 > p2 > · · · > pn or at least p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn.
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As we have already remarked, we show that the chain of weak inequal-
ities holds in the Daniels model if θ1 < θ2 < . . . < θn in the additive
case and γ1 < γ2 < . . . < γn in the multiplicative case.
The strict inequalities also hold under suitable assumptions. To see
that extra assumptions are necessary, suppose we are in the additive
case with n = 3 and the common distribution of X1, X2, X3 is uniform
on the interval [0, 1], with θ1 = 0 < θ2 = 1 < θ3 = 2. Then p1 =
1 > p2 = 0 = p3, so only weak and not strict inequalities hold in
general. The conclusion p1 > p2 > · · · > pn can be verified by direct
computation for the Plackett and Luce model, where pi = λi/(λ1 +
· · ·+ λn) with λi = γ
−1
i .
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we
consider a Thurstonian model with (Z1, . . . , Zn) = (σ1X1, . . . , σnXn),
where the σi are positive constants and (X1, . . . , Xn) is a random vector
with IID standard Gaussian entries. Of course, if n = 2, then p1 =
p2 =
1
2
by the symmetry of the Gaussian distribution, but we show in
Section 2 that if n ≥ 3 and σ1 > σ2 > . . . > σn, then p1 > p2 > · · · >
pn. In Appendix A we compute {p1, p2, p3} for n = 3 to emphasize the
difficulty of establishing by direct computation that such an ordering
holds for general n.
One way to think about this result is that a choice is being made
among n individuals based on their responses to a set of stimuli. The
IID random variables {|X1|, . . . , |Xn|} represent the random stimuli
given to the individuals. The response of individual k to the stimu-
lus |Xk| is Skηk(|Xk|), where ηk(y) = σky and Sk is the sign of Xk,
a {−1,+1}-valued random variable that is independent of |Xk| and
equally likely to be −1 or +1. For each k, the function ηk happens to
be increasing—but as we shall see, that is irrelevant for a conclusion
like that above. What is important is that ηi(y) > ηj(y) for all y and
1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, so that if individuals i and j receive the same stimulus,
the response of individual i will be more extreme than that of indi-
vidual j. The expected responses E[Zk], 1 ≤ k ≤ n, are all zero and
P{Zi > Zj} = P{Zi < Zj} =
1
2
, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n, so that individual i
has no advantage over individual j in a head-to-head contest, and yet
p1 > p2 > · · · > pn.
These observations suggest that a similar result might hold if
(Z1, . . . , Zn) = (S1η1(Y1), . . . , Snηn(Yn)) ,
where (S1, . . . , Sn) is a suitable exchangeable {−1,+1}
n-valued random
vector (recall that a random vector is exchangeable if its joint distribu-
tion is unchanged by any permutation of the coordinates), (Y1, . . . , Yn)
is an exchangeable En-valued random vector for some measurable space
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E, and the functions ηk : E → R+ have the property that ηi(y) > ηj(y)
for all y ∈ E and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n (so that the response Zi is “bolder”
than the response Zj). We show in Section 3 that this conclusion is
indeed valid under appropriate assumptions (e.g., the ordering of the
pk would not hold if Sk = +1 with probability one for all k; to rule this
sort of situation out, we require
P{#{k ∈ [n] : Sk = −1} = 2} ≥
(
n
2
)
P{#{k ∈ [n] : Sk = −1} = 0},
which holds, for example, when {Sk} are IID with individual probabil-
ity at least 1
2
of taking the value −1).
In Section 4 we look at the special case in which {Y1, . . . , Yn} and
{S1, . . . , Sn} are both IID.
We give two applications of our results in Section 5. In Subsection 5.1
we consider a model for randomized experiments where n treatments
are assigned uniformly at random to n individuals. The distribution of
the response of individual j to treatment i is symmetrically distributed
about zero. For a fixed individual j the distribution of the magnitude
of the effect of treatment i is stochastically nonincreasing in i: Lower
numbered treatments are more likely to have larger magnitude effects
than higher numbered ones. We will show that treatment 1 is most
likely to have the greatest effect, treatment 2 is second most likely to
have the greatest effect, and so on, even though no treatment causes
any systematic benefit or harm to any individual.
In Subsection 5.2 we use our results to show that heteroscedasticity
can distort the p-value of a permutation-based test for association be-
tween two series to make it appear that there is positive or negative
association between the two series when there is no such systematic
relationship.
Appendix C sketches an approach for removing the “small-school
bias” in a way that is both fair (equally likely to choose as best any
school, when the schools have the same effect on student scores) and
valid (most likely to choose as best the school that increases student
scores the most).
2. Motivating Gaussian example
Our interest in the general topic of this paper was piqued by the
following observation about a Gaussian version of the Thurstone model
we mentioned in the Introduction.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose n ≥ 3 and (Z1, . . . , Zn) = (σ1X1, . . . , σnXn),
where σi > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and the entries of the random vector
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(X1, . . . , Xn) are independent standard Gaussian random variables. If
σ1 > σ2 > · · · > σn, then p1 > p2 > · · · > pn.
Proof. Let
∧
{·} denote the minimum of a set of real numbers and
∨
{·}
denote the maximum. Note that
pi = P{σiXi < σkXk, k 6= i}
= P
{
σiXi <
∧
k 6=i
σkXk
}
= P
{∨
k 6=i
(σiXi − σkXk) < 0
}
,(2.1)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let φ and Φ denote the standard Gaussian probability density func-
tion and cumulative distribution function, respectively. Then (by con-
ditioning on Xi in the first integral, integrating by parts in the second,
and applying the chain rule in the third),
pi =
∫ ∞
−∞
∏
j 6=i
(
1− Φ
(
x
σj
))
∂
∂x
Φ
(
x
σi
)
dx
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
x
σi
)
∂
∂x
∏
j 6=i
(
1− Φ
(
x
σj
))
dx
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
x
σi
)∑
j 6=i
φ
(
x
σj
)
1
σj
∏
k 6=i,j
(
1− Φ
(
x
σk
))
dx,(2.2)
and so
∂pi
∂σi
= −
∑
j 6=i
∫ ∞
−∞
φ
(
x
σi
)(
−
x
σ2i
)
φ
(
x
σj
)
1
σj
∏
k 6=i,j
(
1− Φ
(
x
σk
))
dx
=
∑
j 6=i
∫ ∞
0
φ
(
x
σi
)(
x
σ2i
)
φ
(
x
σj
)
1
σj
×
[∏
k 6=i,j
(
1− Φ
(
x
σk
))
−
∏
k 6=i,j
(
1− Φ
(
−x
σk
))]
dx
> 0,(2.3)
where we used the facts that φ(z) = φ(−z) for all z ∈ R and that the
function Φ is increasing. It follows that pi is an increasing function of σi,
and, because pi = pj when σi = σj , it is clear that if σ1 > σ2 > · · · > σn,
then p1 > p2 > · · · > pn. 
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Remark 2.2. We show in Appendix A that when n = 3
p1 =
1
2π
arccos
(
−
σ21√
(σ22 + σ
2
1)(σ
2
3 + σ
2
1)
)
> p2 =
1
2π
arccos
(
−
σ22√
(σ21 + σ
2
2)(σ
2
3 + σ
2
2)
)
> p3 =
1
2π
arccos
(
−
σ23√
(σ21 + σ
2
3)(σ
2
2 + σ
2
3)
)
,(2.4)
but finding such explicit expressions for the pi and establishing the
ordering claimed in Proposition 2.1 becomes increasingly complex for
larger values of n. Moreover, Proposition 2.1 holds, with essentially the
same proof, if the common distribution of X1, . . . , Xn is an arbitrary
symmetric distribution possessing a density, whereas it is typically im-
possible to find explicit closed form expressions for the pi in this case.
We observe in Appendix B that even for a symmetric distribution as
tractable as the bilateral exponential, the formulae for the pi are already
somewhat formidable for n = 3 and establishing an ordering analogous
to that claimed in Proposition 2.1 requires a certain amount of algebraic
manipulation.
3. Main theorem
This section presents our main theorem, giving the most general
conditions we have found so far that imply p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn.
Theorem 3.1. Let (Z1, . . . , Zn) be an R
n-valued random vector given
by Zk = Skηk(Yk), 1 ≤ k ≤ n, where:
• (Y1, . . . , Yn) is an exchangeable E
n-valued random vector for
some measurable space (E, E);
• η1, . . . , ηn are measurable functions from E to R+ with the prop-
erty that ηi(y) ≥ ηj(y) for all y ∈ E and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n;
• (S1, . . . , Sn) is an exchangeable {−1,+1}
n-valued random vec-
tor;
• (Y1, . . . , Yn) and (S1, . . . , Sn) are independent;
• P{S1 = · · · = Sn−2 = +1; Sn−1 = −1} ≥ P{S1 = · · · = Sn−1 =
+1}.
Define
pk := P
{
Zk <
∧
ℓ 6=k
Zℓ
}
.
Then, p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn.
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Proof. Let (T1, . . . , Tn) be a vector of independent random variables
that is independent of the pair of random vectors (Y1, . . . , Yn) and
(S1, . . . , Sn) and such that each random variable Tk has an exponential
distribution with mean 1. Set Zǫk = Sk(ηk(Yk) + ǫTk) for 1 ≤ k ≤ n
and ǫ > 0. It is clear that pk is the limit as ǫ ↓ 0 of
pǫk := P
{
Zǫk <
∧
ℓ 6=k
Zǫℓ
}
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, so it suffices to show that pǫ1 ≥ p
ǫ
2 ≥ · · · ≥ p
ǫ
n.
Set
q(m) :=
{
P{S1 = · · · = Sm = +1; Sm+1 = −1}, 0 ≤ m < n− 1,
P{S1 = · · · = Sn−1 = +1}, m = n− 1.
By the assumptions of the theorem, for 0 ≤ m < n− 1,
q(m) = P{Sk1 = · · · = Skm = +1; Skm+1 = −1}
for any subset {k1, . . . , km+1} ⊆ [n] of cardinality m+ 1, and
q(n− 1) = P{Sk1 = · · · = Skn−1 = +1}
for any subset {k1, . . . , kn−1} ⊆ [n] of cardinality n− 1. Thus, q(0) ≥
q(1) ≥ · · · ≥ q(n− 2) and, by assumption, q(n− 2) ≥ q(n− 1).
Suppose that a1, . . . , an ∈ R+ are distinct. If ak 6=
∧
ℓ aℓ, then
P
{
Skak <
∧
ℓ 6=k
Sℓaℓ
}
= P ({Sk = −1} ∩ {Sℓ = +1, ∀ℓ 6= k such that aℓ > ak}) ;
whereas if ak =
∧
ℓ aℓ, then
P
{
Skak <
∧
ℓ 6=k
Sℓaℓ
}
= P {Sℓ = +1, ℓ 6= k} .
In either case,
P
{
Skak <
∨
ℓ 6=k
Sℓaℓ
}
= q (# {1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n : aℓ > ak}) .
The values of |Zǫ1|, . . . , |Z
ǫ
n| are almost surely distinct. For 1 ≤ k ≤ n
set
Mk := # {1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n : |Z
ǫ
ℓ | > |Z
ǫ
k|} .
We must show that
E [q (Mi)] ≥ E [q (Mj)]
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for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n; or, equivalently after summing by parts, that
q(0)P{Mi ≥ 0}+
n−2∑
m=0
[q(m+ 1)− q(m)]P{Mi ≥ m+ 1}
≥ q(0)P{Mj ≥ 0}+
n−2∑
m=0
[q(m+ 1)− q(m)]P{Mj ≥ m+ 1}.
Since P{Mi ≥ 0} = P{Mj ≥ 0} = 1 and q(0) ≥ q(1) ≥ · · · ≥ q(n− 1),
it suffices to show that
P{Mi ≥ m} ≤ P{Mj ≥ m}
for 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1.
Fix 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. Note that
P{Mi ≥ m} = P
{
∃k1, . . . , km 6= i : |Z
ǫ
kh
| > |Zǫi |, 1 ≤ h ≤ m
}
and P{Mj ≥ m} is given by a similar expression. Define functions η˜k,
1 ≤ k ≤ n, by η˜i = ηj , η˜j = ηi, and η˜k = ηk, k /∈ {i, j}. Observe that{
∃k1, . . . , km 6= i : |Z
ǫ
kh
| > |Zǫi |, 1 ≤ h ≤ m
}
= {∃k1, . . . , km 6= i : ηkh(Ykh) + ǫTkh > ηi(Yi) + ǫTi, 1 ≤ h ≤ m}
⊆ {∃k1, . . . , km 6= i : η˜kh(Ykh) + ǫTkh > η˜i(Yi) + ǫTi, 1 ≤ h ≤ m}
because η˜i(y) = ηj(y) ≤ ηi(y) and η˜k(y) ≥ ηk(y) for k 6= i (with
equality unless k = j). Define random variables Y˜k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, by
Y˜i = Yj, Y˜j = Yi, and Y˜k = Yk, k /∈ {i, j}. Define T˜k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
similarly. By exchangeability, (Y1, . . . , Yn) and (Y˜1, . . . , Y˜n) have the
same distribution. Of course, (T1, . . . , Tn) and (T˜1, . . . , T˜n) have the
same distribution. Therefore,
P {∃k1, . . . , km 6= i : η˜kh(Ykh) + ǫTkh > η˜i(Yi) + ǫTi, 1 ≤ h ≤ m}
= P
{
∃k1, . . . , km 6= i : η˜kh(Y˜kh) + ǫT˜kh > η˜i(Y˜i) + ǫT˜i, 1 ≤ h ≤ m
}
.
Now{
∃k1, . . . , km 6= i : η˜kh(Y˜kh) + ǫT˜kh > η˜i(Y˜i) + ǫT˜i, 1 ≤ h ≤ m
}
= {∃k1, . . . , km 6= j : ηkh(Ykh) + ǫTkh > ηj(Yj) + ǫTj , 1 ≤ h ≤ m}
= {Mj ≥ m}.
Putting the above together gives P{Mi ≥ m} ≤ P{Mj ≥ m} as re-
quired.

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Remark 3.2. Assume the hypotheses of Theorem 3.1. Note that
P{S1 = · · · = Sn−2 = +1; Sn−1 = −1}
= P{S1 = · · · = Sn−2 = +1; Sn−1 = −1; Sn = +1}
+P{S1 = · · · = Sn−2 = +1; Sn−1 = −1; Sn = −1}
(3.1)
and
P{S1 = · · · = Sn−1 = +1}
= P{S1 = · · · = Sn−1 = +1; Sn = +1}
+P{S1 = · · · = Sn−1 = +1; Sn = −1}
= P{S1 = · · · = Sn−1 = +1; Sn = +1}
+P{S1 = · · · = Sn−2 = +1; Sn−1 = −1; Sn = +1},(3.2)
by the exchangeability hypothesis, so the hypothesis that
P{S1 = · · · = Sn−2 = +1; Sn−1 = −1} ≥ P{S1 = · · · = Sn−1 = +1}
is equivalent to the hypothesis that
P{S1 = · · · = Sn−2 = +1; Sn−1 = Sn = −1} ≥ P{S1 = · · · = Sn = +1}.
Again using exchangeability, the latter is equivalent to
1(
n
2
)P{#{k ∈ [n] : Sk = −1} = 2} ≥ P{#{k ∈ [n] : Sk = −1} = 0}.
Remark 3.3. Suppose in addition to the hypothesis of Theorem 3.1
that P{Si = Sj = +1} = P{Si = Sj = −1} for i 6= j. Then, by
exchangeability,
P{Zi < Zj} = P{ηi(Yi) < ηj(Yj)}P{Si = Sj = +1}
+P{ηi(Yi) > ηj(Yj)}P{Si = Sj = −1}
+P{Si = −1; Sj = +1}
= P{ηi(Yi) < ηj(Yj)}P{Si = Sj = −1}
+P{ηi(Yi) > ηj(Yj)}P{Si = Sj = +1}
+P{Si = +1; Sj = −1}
= P{Zi > Zj}.(3.3)
Theorem 3.1 is especially interesting in this case, because then Zi is not
systematically smaller than Zj for i < j, and yet p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn.
Remark 3.4. Theorem 3.1 gives a sufficient condition for the weak
inequalities p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn but not the strict inequalities p1 >
p2 > · · · > pn. Examining the proof indicates how the hypotheses can
be strengthened to yield the latter conclusion. Suppose that P{Zi =
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Zj} = 0 for 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n. It is clear from the proof of the theorem
that pi > pj for a given pair 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n if and only if there exists
0 ≤ m ≤ n− 2 such that q(m+ 1) < q(m) and
P {∃k1, . . . , km+1 6= i : ηkh(Ykh) > ηi(Yi), 1 ≤ h ≤ m+ 1}
< P {∃k1, . . . , km+1 6= j : ηkh(Ykh) > ηj(Yj), 1 ≤ h ≤ m+ 1}
for that m. For example, if n ≥ 3 and q(0) = P{S1 = −1} > P{S1 =
+1;S2 = −1} = q(1), then it suffices that P{∃k 6= i : ηk(Yk) >
ηi(Yi)} < P{∃k 6= j : ηk(Yk) > ηj(Yj)} or, equivalently by exchangeabil-
ity,
P


∨
k/∈{i,j}
ηk(Yk) ∨ ηj(Yj) > ηi(Yi)

 < P


∨
k/∈{i,j}
ηk(Yk) ∨ ηi(Yi) > ηj(Yj)


= P


∨
k/∈{i,j}
ηk(Yk) ∨ ηi(Yj) > ηj(Yi)

 .
Because ηj(Yj) ≤ ηi(Yj) and ηi(Yi) ≥ ηj(Yi) it further suffices to have
(3.4)
0 < P


∨
k/∈{i,j}
ηk(Yk) ∨ ηi(Yj) > ηj(Yi),
∨
k/∈{i,j}
ηk(Yk) ∨ ηj(Yj) ≤ ηi(Yi)

 .
4. Independent random variables
Theorem 3.1 has the following consequence when the entries of
(Z1, . . . , Zn) are independent.
Corollary 4.1. Suppose that n ≥ 3. Let (Z1, . . . , Zn) be an R
n-valued
random vector given by Zk = SkWk, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, where:
• W1, . . . ,Wn are independent R
n
+-valued random variables;
• Wi stochastically dominates Wj for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n (that is,
P{Wi > w} ≥ P{Wj > w} for all w ∈ R+);
• S1, . . . , Sn are IID {−1,+1}-valued random variables with
P{Sk = +1} ≤ P{Sk = −1};
• (W1, . . . ,Wn) and (S1, . . . , Sn) are independent.
Define
pk := P
{
Zk <
∧
ℓ 6=k
Zℓ
}
.
Then, p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn.
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Proof. It is possible to writeWk = ηk(Yk), where Y1, . . . , Yn are IID ran-
dom variables that each have the uniform distribution on the interval
[0, 1] and
ηk(y) := inf{w ∈ R+ : P{Wk ≤ w} ≥ y}, y ∈ [0, 1].
It follows from the stochastic ordering assumption on W1, . . . ,Wn that
ηi(y) ≥ ηj(y) for y ∈ [0, 1] and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n.
Also, if we write p for the common value of P{Sk = +1}, then
P{S1 = · · · = Sn−2 = +1; Sn−1 = −1} = pn−2(1− p)
≥ pn−1 = P{S1 = · · · = Sn−1 = +1}.(4.1)
The result now follows from Theorem 3.1. 
Remark 4.2. A simple consequence of Corollary 4.1 is that if n ≥ 3,
V1, . . . , Vn are IID random variables that are symmetrically distributed
(that is, the common distribution of Vk is the same as that of −Vk) and
c1 ≥ c2 ≥ · · · ≥ cn > 0 are nonnegative constants, then
(4.2) P
{
ciVi <
∧
k 6=i
ckVk
}
≥ P
{
cjVj <
∧
k 6=j
ckVk
}
for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n.
The discussion in Remark 3.4 addresses when inequality in (4.2)
will be strict. Assume that n ≥ 3 and c1 > c2 > · · · > cn > 0.
Writing Vk = Sk|Vk|, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, where (S1, . . . , Sn) is IID {−1,+1}-
valued random variables that are independent of (|V1|, . . . , |Vn|) with
P{Sk = ±1} =
1
2
, we have
P{S1 = −1} =
1
2
>
1
4
= P{S1 = +1;S2 = −1}.
Suppose that the common distribution of Vk, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, is diffuse and
that 0 is in the support of this distribution. Then
(4.3)
P


∨
k/∈{i,j}
ck|Vk| ∨ ci|Vj| > cj |Vi|,
∨
k/∈{i,j}
ck|Vk| ∨ cj|Vj| ≤ ci|Vi|

 > 0
for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, which is the special case in the present setting of the
sufficient condition (3.4) for strict inequality. To see this, note first
that for all ǫ > 0 sufficiently small we have
P {ci|Vj| > cj|Vi|, cj|Vj | ≤ ci|Vi|, ci|Vj| > cj |Vj| > ǫ}
= P
{
cj
ci
<
|Vj|
|Vi|
≤
ci
cj
, ci|Vj| > cj|Vj| > ǫ
}
> 0
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whereas
P


∨
k/∈{i,j}
ck|Vk| ≤ ǫ

 > 0
for all ǫ > 0. In particular, we recover Proposition 2.1
It is worth noting that (4.2) doesn’t hold with a strict inequality under
just the assumption that V1, . . . , Vn are IID random variables with a
diffuse, symmetric common distribution. For example, assume that
n = 3 and c1 > c2 > c3 > 0 are given. Suppose that the common
distribution of |Vk|, 1 ≤ k ≤ 3, is supported on an interval [a, b] where
the intervals c1[a, b], c2[a, b], c3[a, b] are pairwise disjoint. Then
P{c1V1 < c2V2 ∧ c2V3} = P{V1 < 0} =
1
2
,
P{c2V2 < c1V1 ∧ c3V3} = P{V1 > 0, V2 < 0} =
1
4
,
and
P{c3V3 < c1V1 ∧ c2V2} = P{V1 > 0, V2 > 0} =
1
4
.
5. Applications
5.1. Randomized experiments. Suppose we are interested in com-
paring n treatments. We will test each treatment on one of n in-
dividuals, which might be people, families, banks, local or national
economies, or plots of land, for instance. Treatments are assigned uni-
formly at random to individuals: All n! assignments are equally likely.
The distribution of the response of individual j to treatment i is a
distribution Pij that is symmetric about zero, so that no treatment
causes any systematic benefit or harm to any individual. Suppose for
each fixed j ∈ [n] and all y > 0 that Pij{x ∈ R : |x| > y} is nonincreas-
ing in i, so that the magnitude of the responses of a fixed individual
to the various treatments are stochastically nonincreasing in the treat-
ment number (i.e., low numbered treatments are more likely to have
effects with a large magnitude than high numbered treatments). Sup-
pose further that given the assignment of treatments to individuals the
responses of the individuals are conditionally independent.
We can represent the response to treatment i as Zi = Siηi(Πi, Ui),
where S1, . . . , Sn are IID {−1,+1}-valued random variables with
P{Si = −1} = P{Si = +1} =
1
2
; (Π1, . . . ,Πn) is a uniform random
permutation of [n]; U1, . . . , Un are IID random variables with a uni-
form distribution on the interval [0, 1]; and ηi(j, ·) is the inverse of the
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function y 7→ Pij{x ∈ R : |x| > y}, that is,
ηi(j, u) := sup{y ≥ 0 : Pij{x ∈ R : |x| ≤ y} < u}.
By assumption, η1(j, u) ≥ · · · ≥ ηn(j, u), and it follows from Theo-
rem 3.1 that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn. Hence, if we think of low values of
the response as desirable, then low numbered treatments are likely to
appear to be the most desirable in a single instance of the experiment,
even though they are also likely to appear to be the least desirable.
In order to give a simple, concrete example of this phenomenon, con-
sider a situation in which there are three tasks of comparable difficulty
that have to be completed and three workers available to do them.
In terms of the setting above, the tasks are the “individuals” and the
workers are the “treatments.”
Number the tasks 1, 2 and 3, and designate the workers by the let-
ters A, B and C. The tasks are assigned to the workers at random,
with the 3! = 6 possible allocations being equally likely. On average,
the workers are equally rapid at completing a given task, but the per-
formance of Worker A is more variable than that of Worker B, which
is more variable than that of Worker C.
We model this very simply by assuming that the time taken to per-
form Task 1 by Worker A (respectively, Workers B and C) is either
T − A or T + A (respectively, T − B or T + B, and T − C or T + C)
with equal probability, where A,B,C are positive constants. Similarly,
the respective times taken by the three workers to perform Tasks 2 and
3 are T ± a, T ± b, T ± c and T ± α, T ± β, T ± γ, with the two
alternatives in each case always being equally likely. We assume that
the times taken by the workers are conditionally independent given the
random allocation of tasks (that is, all 23 = 8 possible choices of sign
are equally likely for any particular allocation).
Worker A Worker B Worker C
Task 1 T ± A T ± B T ± C
Task 2 T ± a T ± b T ± c
Task 3 T ± α T ± β T ± γ
Table 1. Time for each of three workers to complete
each of three tasks
The relative variability of the workers’ performance is modeled by
taking A > B > C, a > b > c, and α > β > γ. The ordering among
these nine quantities is otherwise arbitrary. We thus have an instance
of the general situation considered above with the inconsequential dif-
ference that the responses are symmetric about T rather than 0. We
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will explore how the probability that a particular worker finishes first
depends on the ordering in detail.
Suppose the ordering is A > B > C > a > b > c > α > β > γ > 0.
Then worker A finishes first in the following scenarios:
(1) All signs are negative and A is assigned task 1 (2 of 48)
(2) Only the first and second signs are negative and A is assigned
task 1, or A is assigned task 2 and B is assigned task 3 (3 of
48)
(3) Only the first and third signs are negative and A is assigned
task 1, or A is assigned task 2 and C is assigned task 3 (3 of 48)
(4) Only the first sign is negative (6 of 48)
(5) All signs are positive and A is assigned task 3 (2 of 48)
These comprise 16/48 = 1/3 of the equally likely possibilities, so the
chance that A finishes first is 1/3. Similarly, worker B finishes first in
the following scenarios:
(1) All signs are negative and B is assigned task 1 (2 of 48)
(2) Only the first and second signs are negative and B is assigned
task 1, or B is assigned task 2 and A is assigned task 3 (3 of
48)
(3) Only the second and third signs are negative and B is assigned
task 1, or B is assigned task 2 and C is assigned task 3 (3 of 48)
(4) Only the third sign is negative (6 of 48)
(5) All signs are positive and B is assigned task 3 (2 of 48)
Again, these comprise 1/3 of the possibilities, so the chance that B
finishes first is 1/3; the same is true for C.
However, if the ordering is A > a > α > B > b > β > C > c > γ >
0, then A finishes first if and only if the first sign is negative, which has
chance 1/2. For this ordering, B finishes first if the first sign is positive
and the second is negative, which has chance 1/4. Worker C finishes
first if the first two signs are positive, which also has chance 1/4.
It is possible to consider the various other possibilities that are not
the same as one of these two after a relabeling of the tasks; for example,
if A > a > b > c > B > α > β > γ > C > 0, then the probability that
Worker A finishes first is 5
12
, whereas the probabilities that Workers B
and C finish first are both 7
24
. We do not present an exhaustive list of
the results.
5.2. Heteroscedasticity and nonparametric tests of associa-
tion. The null hypothesis for standard nonparametric (permutation-
based) tests for association between two series, such as the Spearman
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rank correlation test, amounts to the hypothesis that one series is con-
ditionally exchangeable given the other. Heteroscedasticity can make
that null hypothesis false, even when there is no positive (resp. nega-
tive) association between the series, where by positive (resp. negative)
association we mean that, in some sense, larger values of one variable
tend to occur in conjunction with larger (resp. smaller) values of the
other. Our results show qualitatively that this can distort the apparent
p-value of permutation tests for association.
Consider a decreasing deterministic sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn) and
a sequence Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) whose components are independent and
symmetrically distributed, but such that |Zi| stochastically dominates
|Zj| for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. We haven’t given a rigorous definition of as-
sociation, but x and Z are not associated in any intuitively reasonable
sense of the term. However, Corollary 4.1 shows that the first compo-
nent of Z is most likely to be the largest; when that occurs, the rank
of the largest component of Z is aligned with the rank of the largest
component of x. The full distributional details are complicated, but
one might expect that an extension of this phenomenon will tend to
make the Spearman rank correlation coefficient rS take more extreme
values than it would be if the null hypothesis of exchangeability held.
The following simple example from [Wal97, Wal99] shows that the
quantitative difference in probabilities can be quite striking. Let x =
(4, 3, 2, 1) and
Z = (σ1Y1, σ2Y2, σ3Y3, σ4Y4),
where {Yi} are IID standard Gaussian variables, σ1 = 2, and σ2 =
σ3 = σ4 = 1. The chance that rS = 1 is the chance that Z1 >
Z2 > Z3 > Z4. If {Zj} were exchangeable, then that chance would
be 1/24 ≈ 4.17%. Simulation shows that in the heteroscedastic (non-
exchangeable) model,
P{rS(X, Y ) = 1} ≈ 7%,
about 68% higher. Calibrating the Spearman rank correlation test
using the null hypothesis of exchangeability is misleading, because het-
eroscedasticity alone makes the components of Z tend to be closer to
ordered than they would be under random permutations.
We can illustrate the phenomenon even more concretely with the
three workers and three tasks example from Subsection 5.1. Note that
if A > a > α > B > b > β > C > c > γ > 0, then the distribution of
the order in which the workers A,B, C finish is uniform over the four
possibilities (A,B, C), (A, C,B), (B, C,A), (C,B,A) and the distribu-
tion of the Spearman rank correlation rS between the vector of finish
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times for the three workers and the vector (1, 2, 3) is
P{rS = −1} = P
{
rS = −
1
2
}
= P
{
rS = +
1
2
}
= P{rS = +1} =
1
4
,
whereas if the random vector of finish times were exchangeable (that is,
if we were in the usual null situation for the Spearman rank correlation
test), then the distribution of rS would be
P{rS = −1} =
1
6
,
P
{
rS = −
1
2
}
= P
{
rS = +
1
2
}
=
1
3
,
P{rS = +1} =
1
6
,
so performing a Spearman rank correlation test would be likely to re-
sult in the conclusion that there is a positive (or negative) association
between a worker’s label and the worker’s finish time.
Our results do not predict the magnitude of the distortion of the
null distribution of rS, but they do suggest that there will be such a
distortion quite generally when one sequence is heteroscedastic with an
ordering of the degree of dispersion that matches the ordering of mag-
nitudes of the other, even when the components of the first sequence
are independent and have equal means.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
We have presented general conditions on a random vector
(Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn)
that guarantee that the probabilities pi := P{Zi <
∧
j 6=iZj} satisfy
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn; that is, that the probability the i
th coordinate is the
smallest is decreasing in i. Analogous results hold for the the probabil-
ity that the ith coordinate is the largest. The general conclusion is that
“Fortune favors the bold,” and that even if P{Zi > Zj} = P{Zi < Zj}
for 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n, so that no coordinate is systematically larger than
another, we can still have situations in which such an ordering will
occur because the variability of Zi decreases with i. Our results give
technical precision to the intuition embodied by the proverb. We em-
phasize that our results do not require the explicit computation of the
probability that Zi is extreme.
Presumably, even more general conditions that determine the ranks
of the probabilities that each random variable will be extremal could
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be derived. Similarly, we have considered inequalities among the prob-
abilities that different items will be most favored, but it should also
be possible to derive inequalities among the probabilities that various
subsets of the items will have various subsets of the ranks, not just the
chances that each individual item is best. These remain open problems.
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Appendix A. Three independent Gaussians
Suppose that X, Y, Z are independent zero mean Gaussian random
vectors with variances α2 > β2 > γ2 > 0. Observe that P{X <
Y ∧ Z} = P{(Y −X,Z −X) ∈ Q}, where Q is the positive quadrant
{(s, t) ∈ R2 : s > 0, t > 0}. The variance-covariance matrix of the pair
(Y −X,Z −X) is
Σ :=
(
β2 + α2 α2
α2 γ2 + α2
)
.
We can write
(Y −X,Z −X) = (V,W )Σ
1
2 ,
where Σ
1
2 is the positive definite square root of the matrix Σ and (U, V )
is a pair of independent standard Gaussian random variables. The
image of the quadrant Q under the linear map defined by Σ−
1
2 is a
wedge with boundary given by the images of the two positive coordinate
axes. Some algebra shows that
((1, 0)Σ−
1
2 ) · ((0, 1)Σ−
1
2 )√
((1, 0)Σ−
1
2 ) · ((1, 0)Σ−
1
2 )
√
((0, 1)Σ−
1
2 ) · ((0, 1)Σ−
1
2 )
= −
α2√
(β2 + α2)(γ2 + α2)
,(6.1)
where we use a · b to denote the usual inner product of two vectors a
and b.
It follows from the rotational symmetry of the distribution of (U, V )
that
P{X < Y ∧ Z} =
1
2π
arccos
(
−
α2√
(β2 + α2)(γ2 + α2)
)
.
A similar formula holds for P{Y < X ∧ Z} (resp. P{Z < X ∧ Y }) by
interchanging the roles of α2 and β2 (resp. α2 and γ2).
Some more algebra shows that
α4
(β2 + α2)(γ2 + α2)
−
β4
(α2 + β2)(γ2 + β2)
=
(α2 − β2)(α2β2 + β2γ2 + α2γ2)
(α2 + β2)(α2 + γ2)(β2 + γ2)
> 0,
and so
P{X < Y ∧ Z} > P{Y < X ∧ Z}.
Similarly,
P{Y < X ∧ Z} > P{Z < X ∧ Y }.
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Appendix B. The minimum of three bilateral exponentials
Given a dispersion parameter θ > 0, write fθ(x) :=
1
2θ
e−
|x|
θ for the
density of the corresponding bilateral exponential distribution. Note
that ∫ ∞
x
fθ(t) dt =
{
1
2
(1− e−
|x|
θ ) + 1
2
, x < 0,
1
2
e−
|x|
θ , x ≥ 0.
Suppose that X, Y, Z are independent real-valued random variables
with respective bilateral exponential densities fa, fb, fc, where the pa-
rameters satisfy a > b > c > 0, so that X is more dispersed than Y ,
which is more dispersed than Z.
An explicit integration shows that
P{X < Y ∧ Z}
=
∫ ∞
−∞
P{Y > x}P{Z > x}P{X ∈ dx}
=
2a3b+ a2b2 + 2a3c+ 5a2bc+ 2ab2c+ a2c2 + 2abc2 + b2c2
4(a+ b)(a+ c)(ab+ bc + ac)
.
A similar expression for P{Y < X ∧Z} (resp. P{Z < X ∧ Y }) follows
by interchanging the roles of a and b (resp. a and c).
It follows that
P{X < Y ∧ Z} − P{Y < X ∧ Z}
=
(a− b)(b2c2 + a2(b+ c)2 + abc(2b+ 3c))
4(a+ b)(a+ c)(b+ c)(ab+ bc + ac)
> 0
and
P{Y < X ∧ Z} − P{Z < X ∧ Y }
=
(b− c)(b2c2 + 2abc(b+ c) + a2(b2 + 3bc+ c2))
4(a+ b)(a + c)(b+ c)(ab+ bc + ac)
> 0,
so
P{X < Y ∧ Z} > P{Y < X ∧ Z} > P{Z < X ∧ Y }.
Appendix C. Avoiding small-school bias
We consider how one might correct for small-school bias in a model
problem involving standardized testing.
There are n schools of different sizes. The schools draw their students
at random, independently, from the same infinite population. At the
beginning of the school year, the scores students would get on the
standardized test are modeled as IID. Attending school i for the year
increases the expected value of a student’s test score by si, i = 1, . . . , n.
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Let Sij be the score of the jth student at school i at the end of the
year. In this model, {Sij − si} are IID.
We wish to award a “best school” prize to exactly one school, based
on student scores on the standardized test. We want the scheme to be
fair, in that if s1 = s2 = · · · = sn, then all schools are equally likely to
win.
We want the scheme to be valid in the sense that if if si > sj, then
school i is more likely to be picked as “best school” than sj .
The proposed solution (suggested to us by Alex Rivest) is both fair
and valid.
Let m be the smallest school size. The summary score for school i
is the average test score of a random sample of m students at school i.
The prize is awarded to the school with the highest summary score.
The method is fair, since the summary score for each school is de-
termined by a random size-m set of students: If {si} are equal, the
summary scores of the n schools are IID, and every school is equally
likely to rank first. The method is valid, since the score of school i is
stochastically larger than the score for school j if si > sj.
While this method is fair and valid, it relies on a subsample, so it
might not maximize the probability that the prize is awarded to the
school with the largest si among all far and valid methods. Finding a
better method that is both fair and valid is an open problem.
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